The Principles support timely disclosure of all material developments that arise between regular reports. They also support simultaneous reporting of material or required information to all shareholders in order to ensure their equitable treatment. In maintaining close relations with investors and market participants, companies must be careful not to violate this fundamental principle of equitable treatment. Disclosure requirements are not expected to place unreasonable administrative or cost burdens on enterprises. Nor are companies expected to disclose information that may endanger their competitive position unless disclosure is necessary to fully inform the investment decision and to avoid misleading the investor. In order to determine what information should be disclosed at a minimum, many countries apply the concept of materiality. Material information can be defined as information whose omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions taken by users of information.

Material information can also be defined as information that a reasonable investor would consider important in making an investment or voting decision. A strong disclosure regime that promotes real transparency is a pivotal feature of market-based monitoring of companies and is central to shareholders’ ability to exercise their shareholder rights on an informed basis. Experience shows that disclosure can also be a powerful tool for influencing the behaviour of companies and for protecting investors. A strong disclosure regime can help to attract capital and maintain confidence in the capital markets. By contrast, weak disclosure and non-transparent practices can contribute to unethical behaviour and to a loss of market integrity at great cost, not just to the company and its shareholders but also to the economy as a whole. Shareholders and potential investors require access to regular, reliable and comparable information in sufficient detail for them to assess the stewardship of management, and make informed decisions about the valuation, ownership and voting of shares.

Insufficient or unclear information may hamper the ability of the markets to function, increase the cost of capital and result in a poor allocation of resources. Disclosure also helps improve public understanding of the structure and activities of enterprises, corporate policies and performance with respect to environmental and ethical standards, and companies’ relationships with the communities in which they operate. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises may, in many jurisdictions be relevant for multinational enterprises.

A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on:

1. The financial and operating results of the company. Audited financial statements showing the financial performance and the financial situation of the company (most typically including the balance sheet, the profit and loss statement, the cash flow statement and notes to the financial statements) are the most widely used source of information on companies. They enable appropriate monitoring to take place and also help to value securities. Management’s discussion and analysis of operations is typically included in annual reports. This discussion is most useful when read in conjunction with the accompanying financial statements. Investors are particularly interested in information that may shed light on the future performance of the enterprise. Arguably, failures of governance can often be linked to the failure to disclose the “whole picture”, particularly where off-balance sheet items are used to provide guarantees or similar commitments between related companies. It is therefore important that transactions relating to an entire group of companies be disclosed in line with high quality internationally recognised standards and include information about contingent liabilities and offbalance sheet transactions, as well as special purpose entities.

2. Company objectives and non-financial information. In addition to their commercial objectives, companies are encouraged to disclose policies and performance relating to business ethics, the environment and, where material to the company, social issues, human rights and other public policy commitments. Such information may be important for certain investors and other users of information to better evaluate the relationship between companies and the communities in which they operate and the steps that companies have taken to implement their objectives. In many countries, such disclosures are required for large companies, typically as part of their management reports, or companies disclose nonfinancial information voluntarily. This may include disclosure of donations for political purposes, particularly where such information is not easily available through other disclosure channels. Some countries require additional disclosures for large companies, for example net turnover figures or payments made to governments broken down by categories of activity and country (country-by-country reporting).

3. Major share ownership, including beneficial owners, and voting rights. One of the basic rights of investors is to be informed about the ownership structure of the enterprise and their rights vis-à-vis the rights of other owners. The right to such information should also extend to information about the structure of a group of companies and intra-group relations. Such disclosures should make transparent the objectives, nature and structure of the group. Disclosure of ownership data should be provided once certain thresholds of ownership are passed. Such disclosure might include data on major shareholders and others that, directly or indirectly, significantly influence or control or may significantly influence or control the company through, for example, special voting rights, shareholder agreements, the ownership of controlling or large blocks of shares, significant cross shareholding relationships and cross guarantees. It is also good practice to disclose shareholdings of directors, including non-executives. Particularly for enforcement purposes, and to identify potential conflicts of interest, related party transactions and insider trading, information about record ownership needs to be complemented with current information about beneficial ownership. In cases where major shareholdings are held through intermediary structures or arrangements, information about the beneficial owners should therefore be obtainable at least by regulatory and enforcement agencies and/or through the judicial process. In addition, the OECD template Options for Obtaining Beneficial Ownership and Control Information and the Financial Action Task Force’s Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership can be useful in this regard.

4. Remuneration of members of the board and key executives. Information about board and executive remuneration is also of concern to shareholders. Of particular interest is the link between remuneration and longterm company performance. Companies are generally expected to disclose information on the remuneration of board members and key executives so that investors can assess the costs and benefits of remuneration plans and the contribution of incentive schemes, such as stock option schemes, to company performance. Disclosure on an individual basis (including termination and retirement provisions) is increasingly regarded as good practice and is now mandated in many countries. In these cases, some jurisdictions call for remuneration of a certain number of the highest paid executives to be disclosed, while in others it is confined to specified positions.

5. Information about board members, including their qualifications, the selection process, other company directorships and whether they are regarded as independent by the board. Investors require information on individual board members and key executives in order to evaluate their experience and qualifications and assess any potential conflicts of interest that might affect their judgement. For board members, the information should include their qualifications, share ownership in the company, membership of other boards, other executive positions, and whether they are considered by the board to be an independent member. It is important to disclose membership of other boards not only because it is an indication of experience and possible time pressures facing a member of the board, but also because it may reveal potential conflicts of interest and makes transparent the degree to which there are inter-locking boards.

National principles, and in some cases laws, lay down specific duties for board members who can be regarded as independent and recommend that a significant part, in some instances a majority, of the board should be independent. It should be incumbent on the board to set out the reasons why a member of the board can be considered independent. It is then up to the shareholders, and ultimately the market, to determine if those reasons are justified. Several countries have concluded that companies should disclose the selection process and especially whether it was open to a broad field of candidates. Such information should be provided in advance of any decision by the general shareholder’s meeting or on a continuing basis if the situation has changed materially.

6. Related party transactions. To ensure that the company is being run with due regard to the interests of all its investors, it is essential to fully disclose all material related party transactions and the terms of such transactions to the market individually. In many jurisdictions this is indeed already a legal requirement. In case the jurisdiction does not define materiality, companies should be required to also disclose the policy/criteria adopted for determining material related party transactions. Related parties should at least include entities that control or are under common control with the company, significant shareholders including members of their families and key management personnel. While the definition of related parties in internationally accepted accounting standards provides a useful reference, the corporate governance framework should ensure that all related parties are properly identified and that in cases where specific interests of related parties are present, material transactions with consolidated subsidiaries are also disclosed.

Transactions involving the major shareholders (or their close family, relations, etc.), either directly or indirectly, are potentially the most difficult type of transactions. In some jurisdictions, shareholders above a limit as low as 5 per cent shareholding are obliged to report transactions. Disclosure requirements include the nature of the relationship where control exists and the nature and amount of transactions with related parties, grouped as appropriate. Given the inherent opaqueness of many transactions, the obligation may need to be placed on the beneficiary to inform the board about the transaction, which in turn should make a disclosure to the market. This should not absolve the firm from maintaining its own monitoring, which is an important task for the board. To make disclosure more informative, some jurisdictions distinguish related party transactions according to their materiality and conditions. Ongoing disclosure of material transactions is required, with a possible exception for recurrent transactions on “market terms”, which can be disclosed only in periodic reports. To be effective, disclosure thresholds may need to be based mainly on quantitative criteria, but avoidance of disclosure through splitting of transactions with the same related party should not be permitted.

7. Foreseeable risk factors. Users of financial information and market participants need information on reasonably foreseeable material risks that may include: risks that are specific to the industry or the geographical areas in which the company operates; dependence on commodities; financial market risks including interest rate or currency risk; risk related to derivatives and off-balance sheet transactions; business conduct risks; and risks related to the environment. The Principles envision the disclosure of sufficient and comprehensive information to fully inform investors of the material and foreseeable risks of the enterprise. Disclosure of risk is most effective when it is tailored to the particular company and industry in question. Disclosure about the system for monitoring and managing risk is increasingly regarded as good practice.

8. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. Companies are encouraged, and in some countries even obliged, to provide information on key issues relevant to employees and other stakeholders that may materially affect the performance of the company or that may have significant impacts upon them. Disclosure may include management/employee relations, including remuneration, collective bargaining coverage, and mechanisms for employee representation, and relations with other stakeholders such as creditors, suppliers, and local communities. Some countries require extensive disclosure of information on human resources. Human resource policies, such as programmes for human resource development and training, retention rates of employees and employee share ownership plans, can communicate important information on the competitive strengths of companies to market participants.

9. Governance structures and policies, including the content of any corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented. Companies should report their corporate governance practices, and such disclosure should be mandated as part of the regular reporting. Companies should implement corporate governance principles set, or endorsed, by the regulatory or listing authority with mandatory reporting on a “comply or explain” or similar basis. Disclosure of the governance structures and policies of the company, including, in the case of non-operating holding companies, that of significant subsidiaries, is important for the assessment of a company’s governance and should cover the division of authority between shareholders, management and board members. Companies should clearly disclose the different roles and responsibilities of the CEO and/or Chair and, where a single person combines both roles, the rationale for this arrangement. It is also good practice to disclose the articles of association, board charters and, where applicable, committee structures and charters. As a matter of transparency, procedures for shareholders meetings should ensure that votes are properly counted and recorded, and that a timely announcement of the outcome is made.

B. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial reporting.

The application of high quality accounting and disclosure standards is expected to significantly improve the ability of investors to monitor the company by providing increased relevance, reliability and comparability of reporting, and improved insight into company performance. Most countries mandate the use of internationally recognised standards for financial reporting, which can serve to improve transparency and the comparability of financial statements and other financial reporting between countries. Such standards should be developed through open, independent, and public processes involving the private sector and other interested parties such as professional associations and independent experts. High quality domestic standards can be achieved by making them consistent with one of the internationally recognised accounting standards. In many countries, listed companies are required to use these standards.

C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified, auditor in accordance with high-quality auditing standards in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects.

In addition to certifying that the financial statements represent fairly the financial position of a company, the audit statement should also include an opinion on the way in which financial statements have been prepared and presented. This should contribute to an improved control environment in the company. In some jurisdictions, the external auditors are also required to report on the company’s corporate governance. The independence of auditors and their accountability to shareholders should be required. The designation of an audit regulator independent from the profession, consistent with the Core Principles of the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR), is an important factor in improving audit quality. It is good practice for external auditors to be recommended by an independent audit committee of the board or an equivalent body and to be appointed either by that committee/body or by shareholders directly.

Moreover, the IOSCO Principles of Auditor Independence and the Role of Corporate Governance in Monitoring an Auditor’s Independence states that, “standards of auditor independence should establish a framework of principles, supported by a combination of prohibitions, restrictions, other policies and procedures and disclosures, that addresses at least the following threats to independence: self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation”. The audit committee or an equivalent body should provide oversight of the internal audit activities and should also be charged with overseeing the overall relationship with the external auditor including the nature of nonaudit services provided by the auditor to the company. Provision of non-audit services by the external auditor to a company can significantly impair their independence and might involve them auditing their own work. To deal with the skewed incentives which may arise, the disclosure of payments to external auditors for non-audit services should be required.

Examples of other provisions designed to promote auditor independence include, a total ban or severe limitation on the nature of non-audit work which can be undertaken by an auditor for their audit client, mandatory rotation of auditors (either partners or in some cases the audit partnership), a fixed tenure for auditors, joint audits, a temporary ban on the employment of an ex-auditor by the audited company and prohibiting auditors or their dependents from having a financial stake or management role in the companies they audit. Some countries take a more direct regulatory approach and limit the percentage of non-audit income that the auditor can receive from a particular client or limit the total percentage of auditor income that can come from one client. An issue which has arisen in some jurisdictions concerns the pressing need to ensure the competence of the audit profession. A registration process for individuals to confirm their qualifications is considered good practice. This needs, however, to be supported by ongoing training and monitoring of work experience to ensure appropriate levels of professional competence and scepticism.

D. External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit.

The practice that external auditors are recommended by an independent audit committee of the board or an equivalent body and that external auditors are appointed either by that committee/body or by the shareholders’ meeting directly can be regarded as good practice since it clarifies that the external auditor should be accountable to the shareholders. It also underlines that the external auditor owes a duty of due professional care to the company rather than any individual or group of corporate managers that they may interact with for the purpose of their work.

E. Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users.

Channels for the dissemination of information can be as important as the content of the information itself. While the disclosure of information is often provided for by legislation, filing and access to information can be cumbersome and costly. Filing of statutory reports has been greatly enhanced in some countries by electronic filing and data retrieval systems. Countries should move to the next stage by integrating different sources of company information, including shareholder filings. Company websites also provide the opportunity for improving information dissemination, and some countries now require companies to have a website that provides relevant and significant information about the company itself. Provisions for ongoing disclosure which includes periodic disclosure and continuous or current disclosure which must be provided on an ad hoc basis should be required. With respect to continuous/current disclosure, good practice is to call for “immediate” disclosure of material developments, whether this means “as soon as possible” or is defined as a prescribed maximum number of specified days. The IOSCO Principles for Periodic Disclosure by Listed Entities set guidance for the periodic reports of companies that have securities listed or admitted to trading on a regulated market on which retail investors participate. The IOSCO Principles for Ongoing Disclosure and Material Development Reporting by Listed Entities set forth common principles of ongoing disclosure and material development reporting for listed companies.